A security assessment for a small firm rarely finds a single catastrophic flaw. It finds a set of ordinary gaps that each look minor and together give an attacker an easy path: one mailbox without MFA, an administrator account used for daily email, a backup that shares the same password as everything else.
Breach data shows why these gaps matter. Verizon’s 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report found that the use of stolen credentials was the most common way attackers got in (22 percent of breaches), followed closely by exploiting software flaws (20 percent). It found ransomware in 88 percent of breaches at small and midsize businesses. Most of the gaps below feed directly into one of those three.
1. MFA on most accounts, but not all#
This is the gap assessors find most often. The firm turned on multi-factor authentication years ago, and since then exceptions have piled up: a shared mailbox for intake, a scanner that sends email, a partner who complained, a service account for the practice management system, or older sign-in methods that skip MFA entirely.
Attackers look for exactly these exceptions. One mailbox without MFA is enough to start a wire fraud scheme or a phishing campaign against your clients.
How to check: export the list of users and their MFA status from Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace. Look for anyone excluded from your MFA policy, and confirm that legacy authentication protocols are blocked.
2. Backups that have never been restored#
Most small firms have backups. Far fewer have restored from them, and fewer still keep a copy that an attacker with administrator access can’t delete. Ransomware crews look for backups first and destroy them before encrypting anything else.
How to check: ask three questions. Is there a copy that is offline or immutable? Does the backup system use its own credentials with MFA? When was the last full restore test, and how long did it take?
3. Too many administrators#
Assessments often find that half the staff have administrator rights on their own computers, or that the managing partner’s everyday account is also a global administrator in Microsoft 365. Every admin account is a target, and a phishing email opened by an admin does far more damage.
How to check: list everyone with administrator rights in your cloud tenant, your domain and on local machines. Each person should need it, and admins should use a separate account for admin work.
4. Firewalls and VPNs that haven’t been updated#
Internet-facing equipment is where attackers look for unpatched flaws. Verizon’s 2025 report found that VPNs and other edge devices made up 22 percent of vulnerability exploitation cases, up from 3 percent the year before, and that organizations had fully fixed only about half of those flaws, with a median of 32 days to do it.
Small firms often buy a firewall, have it installed and never touch it again. Its firmware ages, and so do its known vulnerabilities.
How to check: find the make, model and firmware version of your firewall and any VPN appliance, and compare them with the manufacturer’s current release and security advisories.
5. Remote Desktop and remote tools open to the internet#
Remote Desktop Protocol exposed directly to the internet is a long-standing entry point for ransomware. Assessments also find remote management and remote support tools installed for a one-off job and never removed.
How to check: run an external scan of your public IP addresses, and inventory every remote access tool installed on firm computers.
6. Accounts that outlived the people who used them#
Former employees with active accounts, contractors whose access never ended, and shared logins that everyone knows are all common. They are hard to monitor and nobody notices if they are used.
How to check: compare your active user list against current staff. Disable anything that doesn’t match, and replace shared logins with named accounts.
7. Partial EDR coverage, or alerts nobody watches#
A firm may have bought endpoint detection and response, but it covers 40 of 46 laptops, or it isn’t on the file server, or its alerts go to an inbox no one checks. Attacks often happen at night and over weekends, when nobody is watching.
How to check: compare the EDR console’s device count against your device inventory, and find out who receives alerts and in what hours.
8. Email that is easy to spoof#
Missing or weak SPF, DKIM and DMARC records make it easier for criminals to send email that appears to come from your domain to your own staff and clients. Assessments often find DMARC set to “none,” which reports on spoofing without stopping it.
How to check: look up your domain’s DMARC record with any free DNS lookup tool and see whether the policy is “none,” “quarantine” or “reject.”
9. Vendors with more access than anyone realized#
IT providers, practice management vendors, e-discovery platforms and cloud backup services often hold standing access to firm systems. Verizon found that breaches involving a third party doubled to 30 percent in its 2025 report. Assessments often find vendor accounts with administrator rights and no MFA.
How to check: list each vendor that can reach your systems or data, what it can reach, and whether its access uses MFA.
10. An incident response plan nobody has read#
Many firms have a plan from a template. Few have practiced it, and few keep a copy that works if email and the file server are down. When an incident happens, people waste the first hours working out who to call.
How to check: find the plan, confirm the insurer’s breach hotline number is in it, and print a copy with key contacts. Run a one-hour tabletop exercise with the people named in it.
11. Laptops and phones without encryption or management#
Unencrypted laptops turn a lost bag into a reportable breach. Phones with firm email and no device management can’t be wiped remotely.
How to check: use your device management tool, or ask your IT provider, for a report of encryption status across every laptop and phone that holds firm data.
12. Policies that don’t match what the firm does#
Assessments often find a security policy that promises quarterly access reviews, annual training and encrypted backups, next to a practice that does none of them. Insurers, auditors and clients read policies as commitments, so a gap between the document and reality becomes a finding.
How to check: read your policies with the questions above in mind, and mark every promise you can’t show evidence for.
What to fix first#
Not all gaps carry the same risk. If you can only address a few this quarter, work in this order:
- Close every MFA exception on email, remote access and admin accounts.
- Create a backup copy an administrator can’t delete, and test a restore.
- Update the firewall and VPN, and close any exposed Remote Desktop.
- Reduce administrator accounts and separate admin work from daily use.
- Make sure EDR covers every device and someone watches the alerts.
These five address the routes behind most ransomware and email fraud at small firms. The rest matter, and they can follow over the next two quarters.
Run the six-question self-check first
Before booking a full assessment, try the six questions insurers ask most: MFA everywhere, tested offline backups, EDR, no exposed Remote Desktop, critical patches within 14 days and a rehearsed response plan. Any “no” is where to start.
What a good assessment gives you#
A useful assessment for a small firm should be fixed in scope and price, use read-only checks that change nothing, take around a week, and end with a report that ranks findings by risk and maps them to the questions your insurer and clients ask. It should also tell you plainly what it can’t do: an assessment describes your firm on the day it was run, and no assessor can promise that an insurer will accept you or that you’ll never have an incident.
Questions people ask
How long does a small business security assessment take?
For a firm of 10 to 50 people, a focused assessment usually takes about a week from kickoff to report. Larger or multi-site environments take longer and are scoped separately.
Will an assessment disrupt our systems?
A well-run assessment uses read-only checks and changes nothing. Ask the assessor to confirm in writing that their scripts don't modify settings, and agree on any active testing in advance.
We have an IT provider. Don't they handle this?
Many IT providers keep systems running well and still leave security gaps, because the contract covers support and uptime rather than security controls. An independent assessment gives you and your provider the same list to work from.
How often should a small firm be assessed?
Once a year is a sensible baseline, and before each cyber insurance renewal if your insurer's questions have changed. Re-check sooner after a major change such as a new office, a new practice system or a change of IT provider.
Sources
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This guide is general information for small firms. It is not legal, insurance or compliance advice for your situation.