A paralegal gets an email from a client who is about to receive settlement funds. The client has changed banks and attaches new wiring instructions on what looks like the bank’s letterhead. The email comes from the client’s real address, quotes the last message in the thread and arrives on a Friday afternoon. The paralegal updates the file. The money leaves on Monday and is gone by Tuesday.
Nothing in that story required a virus or a hacked server at the firm. The criminal broke into the client’s mailbox weeks earlier, read the thread and waited for money to be in motion. That is business email compromise, usually shortened to BEC, and it is the fraud most likely to cost a small professional firm six figures in a single afternoon.
How much BEC costs#
The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received 24,768 BEC complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $3.046 billion, up from 21,442 complaints and $2.77 billion in 2024. BEC was the second most costly crime type in the report, behind investment fraud. The report also found that wire transfers carried the bulk of BEC losses, while cryptocurrency dominated investment and tech support scams.
Those figures count only what victims reported. Many firms settle privately with a client or absorb the loss, so the true number is higher.
Real estate shows up repeatedly. The FBI recorded 12,368 real estate fraud complaints and $275.1 million in losses in 2025, and a large share of closing-funds diversions is filed under BEC rather than under real estate, so the two figures overlap without adding up.
Why law firms, accountants and title companies#
Criminals go where large payments move on instructions sent by email. Three kinds of small firm fit that description better than most.
- Law firms hold client money in trust accounts and release it for settlements, closings and estate distributions. A single disbursement can exceed the firm’s annual profit.
- Accounting and bookkeeping firms pay vendors, run payroll and file returns for clients. They can change a direct deposit, approve an invoice or send W-2 data on a request that looks routine.
- Title and escrow companies move a buyer’s entire cash to close in one wire, on a date everyone in the thread knows in advance.
All three also share a weakness: they trade emails with people outside the firm whose security they can’t control. Your own mailbox can be locked down perfectly while a client’s, a lender’s or a real estate agent’s is wide open.
How the attack works#
Most BEC cases follow the same four steps, whatever the industry.
1. Get into a mailbox, or fake one#
The usual entry is a stolen password. A phishing page that copies the Microsoft 365 or Google sign-in screen collects the password, and if the account has no multi-factor authentication (MFA), the criminal walks in. More capable crews use pages that relay the MFA prompt in real time and capture the session token, which gets them past text-message and app codes.
When no mailbox can be broken, the criminal registers a look-alike domain instead. smithlaw-firm.com for smithlawfirm.com, or a capital I in place of a lowercase l, is enough to fool a reader on a phone.
2. Watch and wait#
Inside a mailbox, criminals read before they act. They learn who approves payments, how the firm writes, which deals are closing and when. They often create inbox rules that forward copies of messages to an outside address, or move any reply containing words like “wire,” “bank” or “fraud” into a folder nobody checks. Those rules let them keep watching after a password reset.
3. Strike when money is moving#
The request arrives at the moment a payment is expected, so it looks like the next step in a real transaction. Common versions include:
- new wiring instructions from a “client,” “seller” or “title company” just before a closing or settlement
- an invoice from a real vendor with new bank details
- an urgent request from a “partner” or “owner” to pay something today, often while that person is traveling
- an HR request to change a staff member’s direct deposit account
- a request for W-2s or client tax records, which become identity theft later
Criminals have started adding a phone call or voicemail that sounds like the person in the email. The FBI’s 2025 report tracked AI as its own descriptor for the first time and tied more than $30 million in BEC losses to AI-assisted schemes. A familiar voice is no longer proof of who is speaking.
4. Move the money fast#
Funds usually land in a domestic “money mule” account opened with stolen or borrowed identity, then move on within hours, often overseas or into cryptocurrency. Every hour you lose makes recovery less likely.
The controls that stop it#
No single tool stops BEC. What works is a small set of controls that cover each step above, plus one procedure that holds even when every technical control fails.
A callback rule for every change in payment instructions#
This is the control that matters most, and it costs nothing. Write it down and apply it without exceptions:
- Any new or changed bank details, from anyone, are confirmed by phone before money moves.
- The call goes to a number already on file from the start of the engagement, or from the vendor’s contract, never to a number in the email or the attached letter.
- The person who confirms the change records who they spoke to, when and what was confirmed.
- No one releases a wire on new instructions on the same day they arrive, unless the callback is complete.
Tell clients at the start of every matter, in writing, that your firm will never change its wiring instructions by email. Put the same sentence in your email signature. That gives clients a rule to check fraudsters against.
MFA on every mailbox, with phishing-resistant methods for anyone who moves money#
Turn on MFA for every user, with no exceptions for partners or shared mailboxes. For people who approve payments and for administrators, use methods that a relay page can’t capture, such as passkeys or hardware security keys, or at least number matching in the authenticator app. Block legacy sign-in protocols that skip MFA entirely.
Watch for the rules criminals leave behind#
Check every mailbox for rules that forward mail outside the firm or move messages into rarely opened folders. In Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace you can block automatic forwarding to external addresses at the organization level, and you should. Review sign-in alerts for logins from unexpected countries or at odd hours.
Make your own domain hard to fake#
Publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC records for every domain you send from, and move DMARC to a reject policy once your legitimate mail passes. That stops criminals from sending mail that appears to come from your exact domain. It does not stop look-alike domains, so turn on external-sender tags that label mail from outside the firm, and consider buying the most obvious misspellings of your own domain.
Split the payment duties#
The person who enters new bank details should not be the person who releases the wire. In most business online banking you can require a second approver for new payees and for wires above a set amount, and you can add positive pay or payee name matching where the bank offers it. Ask your bank which of these you already have and are not using.
Train for the scenario, not the theory#
Generic phishing training helps, but the people who move money need practice with the exact attack. Run a short exercise where a “client” sends changed instructions, and see whether the callback happens. Make it clear that nobody gets in trouble for delaying a payment to verify it.
What to do in the first hour#
If money has gone to the wrong account, speed decides the outcome. Run these steps in parallel if more than one person is available.
- Call your bank’s fraud line now. Ask for an immediate recall of the wire and ask them to contact the receiving bank to freeze the funds. The FBI also suggests asking for a Hold Harmless Letter or Letter of Indemnity. Have the date, amount, receiving bank and account number in front of you.
- File a complaint at ic3.gov. Fill in every banking field. Complete complaints are what the IC3 Recovery Asset Team uses to work with banks through the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. For an international wire, the FBI’s process expects a SWIFT recall to be underway and, for the international kill chain, a transfer of $50,000 or more within the last 72 hours. Report smaller and older losses too.
- Call your cyber insurer’s claims or breach hotline. Many policies require notice within a short window and expect you to use their panel of forensic firms and lawyers. Calling a vendor of your own first can cost you coverage.
- Secure the mailbox. Reset the password, sign out every session, review MFA methods, and remove any forwarding or hiding rules. Don’t delete the evidence. Export the rules and the relevant messages first.
- Warn everyone in the transaction by phone, using known numbers, so nobody else sends money to the same account.
The Recovery Asset Team’s record shows the value of speed. In 2025 it worked 3,900 incidents involving $1.16 billion in attempted theft and froze $679 million, a 58 percent success rate. On domestic cases alone it worked 3,574 incidents and froze $507 million of $833 million, or 61 percent. FinCEN says it is most likely to stop or recover funds when a fraudulent wire is reported within 72 hours.
After the incident#
Once the money question is settled, work out what happened. A forensic review should establish whether your firm’s mailbox was entered, which messages the criminal could read, and whether client data was exposed. That last question can trigger breach notification duties under state law, and for lawyers it engages the duty of confidentiality and ABA Formal Opinion 483 on obligations after a data breach.
Then close the gap that let it happen and write it into your procedures. Most firms that lose money to BEC once tighten everything afterward. The cheaper path is to do it before.
A BEC checklist for small firms#
- Written callback rule for any new or changed payment details, with numbers taken only from records on file
- Clients told in writing at engagement that wiring instructions never change by email
- MFA enforced on every mailbox, including shared and partner accounts
- Phishing-resistant MFA for everyone who approves payments and for admins
- Legacy sign-in protocols blocked
- Automatic forwarding to external addresses blocked
- Monthly review of inbox rules and sign-in alerts
- SPF, DKIM and DMARC published, with DMARC at reject
- External-sender tags on incoming mail
- Dual approval for new payees and large wires at the bank
- Payment staff trained on a realistic changed-instructions scenario
- Bank fraud line, ic3.gov and your insurer’s hotline in a printed first-hour sheet
- Cyber policy checked for a funds transfer fraud or social engineering endorsement and its sublimit
What to do this week
Write the callback rule on one page, send it to everyone who can release a payment, and add the sentence “We will never change our wiring instructions by email” to your engagement letters and email signatures. Then check every mailbox for external forwarding rules. Those three steps close the gaps behind most BEC losses at small firms.
Questions people ask
What is business email compromise?
Business email compromise (BEC) is fraud in which a criminal uses a real or look-alike business email account to trick someone into sending money or sensitive data. The FBI describes it as compromising legitimate email through social engineering or intrusion to make an unauthorized transfer of funds. Most BEC losses move by wire transfer.
Can I get money back after a fraudulent wire?
Sometimes, if you move fast. Call your bank's fraud line and ask for a recall, then file at ic3.gov with full banking details. In 2025 the FBI's Recovery Asset Team froze $679 million of $1.16 billion in attempted theft across the cases it worked. Recovery odds fall sharply after the first 72 hours.
Does cyber insurance cover wire fraud?
Often only through a social engineering or funds transfer fraud endorsement, usually with a lower sublimit than the main policy, and some carriers require a documented callback procedure before they pay. Read that section of your policy and ask your broker in writing.
Is MFA enough to stop business email compromise?
It stops the most common way in, which is a stolen password. It does not stop a criminal who emails from a look-alike domain or a client's hacked mailbox. That is why a callback rule for every change to payment instructions matters as much as MFA.
Sources
- 2025 Internet Crime Report (FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, April 2026)
- Business Email Compromise (FBI IC3 guidance)
- Domestic Financial Fraud Kill Chain process (FBI IC3)
- International Financial Fraud Kill Chain process (FBI IC3)
- Rapid Response Program fact sheet (FinCEN)
- Responding to wire fraud (Old Republic Title)
Keep reading
This guide is general information for small firms. It is not legal, insurance or compliance advice for your situation.